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Most people are familiar with "pleading the Fifth." They
understand it to mean they have "the right to remain silent"' and that
the government cannot force them to disclose incriminating
information that could lead to their own indictment or conviction.2
What most people don't know, however, is that this right does not
apply to most business-related activities. Under the little-known
"collective entity doctrine," the Supreme Court has held that
corporations,  partnerships,4 labor unions,   and all "collective
group[s]" with an "impersonal" character do not possess any privilege
against self-incrimination.6
In its harshest opinion, the Court held in Braswell v. United States,
by a vote of 5 to 4, that a corporation's sole shareholder could be forced
to produce, compile, organize, and (by way of compelled testimony)
authenticate his company's incriminating business records.' "[T]he
custodian of . . . entity records holds those documents in a
representative rather than a personal capacity," the Court reasoned.'
Thus, "the custodian's act of production is not deemed a personal act,
but rather an act of the corporation," which has no Fifth Amendment
privilege.9 In other words, businesses have no privilege against self-
incrimination, and records custodians are mere extensions of their
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'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).
2 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 111 (1970) (Black, J., concurring) (under
the "plain and obvious meaning" of the Self-Incrimination Clause, "a criminal
defendant cannot be required to give evidence, testimony, or any other assistance to
the State to aid it in convicting him of a crime").
3Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 376, 385 (1911); Dreier v. United States,
221 U.S. 394, 400 (1911).
4 Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974).
1United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944).
6 See id. at 699, 701.
7Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108-14 (1988).
8 Id. at 109-10.
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businesses; therefore, they forfeit that privilege while acting on behalf
of the business.
What the collective entity doctrine means in real-world terms is
that businesses and their records custodians can never resist
government-issued subpoenas on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
grounds, regardless of how small their business may be.' 0 Assume, for
example, that you and your spouse decide to start a small business.
You go to your Secretary of State's website, fill out the necessary
paperwork, and form "Mom and Pop, LLC." Congratulations, you
have just forfeited a fundamental constitutional right. The moment
you filed your articles of organization with the Secretary of State's
Office, you and your spouse, as the business's records custodians,
surrendered your right to withhold any business-related documents
from the government."   The IRS-without even a reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing-can serve you with a subpoena duces tecum
and require you to produce, compile, and authenticate all of your
business's records. And if you refuse to comply, you will likely be
held in contempt of court, meaning you could face serious fines and
even jail time. In effect, the Braswell Court held that the government
can force small-business owners to create the exhibits that will be used
against them at trial.
This article argues that the Court should revisit the collective entity
doctrine for two primary reasons: (1) the doctrine is inconsistent with
dozens of related cases, especially in the area of corporate rights and
the waiver of constitutional rights; and (2) the explosion of modem
limited liability companies (LLCs) has caused millions of small-
business owners to unwittingly forfeit a fundamental right, a result the
Braswell Court could not have foreseen. This article proceeds in four
parts. Part I provides a brief history of the collective entity doctrine,
beginning with 1886's Boyd v. United States and ending with 2000's
United States v. Hubbell. Part II shows how Braswell is inconsistent
with the Court's self-incrimination jurisprudence and its evolving
understanding and recognition of businesses' rights. Part III explains
how the emergence of LLCs and other limited liability entities has
caused millions of Americans to unwittingly forfeit their self-
incrimination rights. And Part IV briefly addresses likely
counterarguments to this article.
10 Id. at 108-10.
i See id.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COLLECTIVE ENTITY DOCTRINE
As Yale law professor Akhil Amar has recognized: "The Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an unsolved riddle of
vast proportions, a Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights."1 2
Sticking with this metaphor, the collective entity doctrine has proved
to be a particularly difficult knot to untie. This section summarizes the
Court's attempts-more accurately, failed attempts-to articulate a
durable rationale for the doctrine.13
A. The collective entity rule: state-sanctioned businesses and their
agents have no Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights.
Individuals have a clearly established Fifth Amendment right to
refuse to answer self-incriminating questions asked by state actors. 14
When a witness is subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury to give
self-incriminating testimony, the usual practice is for the witness's
counsel to advise the government, in writing, that the witness intends
to assert her Fifth Amendment rights, at which point "the witness
ordinarily should be excused from testifying." 5
Similarly, the Fifth Amendment was originally interpreted to
protect all private papers from government-compelled production.
The Supreme Court first announced this original rule in 1886 in Boyd
v. United States.16 "[A]ny forcible and compulsory extortion of a
man's . .. private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of a
crime," the Boyd Court held, compels him to be a "witness" against
himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.7 To the Boyd Court,
using a person's property against him in a criminal case was
12Akhil Amar & Renee L. Lerner, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857, 857 (1995).
" Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48
PiTT. L. REV. 27, 65-66 (1986) (noting that the collective entity doctrine has
proved to be a particularly convoluted due to the Court's "difficulty in articulating
a durable rationale" for the doctrine).
14 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (recognizing that citizens
have the right to refuse to answer "official questions .. . in any ... proceeding,
civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate [them]
in future criminal proceedings"); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 240-41
(1941) (recognizing that suspects must be afforded the "free choice to admit, to
deny, or to refuse to answer" the questions of state officials); see also Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 443-44 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-11.154 (1997).
16 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886):
17Id. at 630.
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tantamount to compelling him to utter an incriminating statement.18
The Boyd Court did not distinguish between natural persons and
corporations with respect to the application of the Fifth Amendment's
self-incrimination privilege; its only concern was whether the
suspect's privacy interests had been invaded in an intolerable
manner.1 9
In the early 1900s, however, in Hale v. Henkel,20 the Supreme
Court abandoned Boyd and established two self-incrimination
principles that have survived to this day. First, the Hale Court held
that the privilege against self-incrimination is a personal privilege that
cannot be invoked to protect a third party, including third-party
corporations.2 1  Second, and more importantly for this article, the
Court held that corporations do not possess self-incrimination rights
under the Fifth Amendment.22
In Hale, a corporate officer was served with a subpoena to produce
corporate documents. The officer, on behalf of the corporation,
resisted the subpoena on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination grounds.
On appeal, the Hale Court rejected the officer's self-incrimination
argument: "[W]e are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction ...
between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no right
to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit
of the State."23  The Court held that corporate books should not be
considered "private papers" worthy of Fifth Amendment protection.2 4
The Court ended its opinion in Hale by holding:
The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a
citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his
own way. ... He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors
to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation,
so far as it may tend to [in]criminate him.
'8 1d. at 634-35.
1 See id. at 630 ("It is not the breaking of [a man's] doors, and the rummaging of
his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense." Rather, "all invasions on
the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life" are unconstitutional.).
20 See generally Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)..
21 Id. at 69-70.
22Id.
23 Id at 74.
24 Id. at 71-72 (rejecting Boyd's premise that a corporation's "private papers"
should presumptively receive constitutional protection).
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Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the State.
. . . Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so
long as it obeys the laws of its creation.... It would be a strange
anomaly to hold that a State, having chartered a corporation to
make use of certain franchises, could not . . . demand the
production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose.
[W]e are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation . . .
cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such
corporation ... 25
These paragraphs have served as the basis for the collective entity
doctrine for over a century.
Since Hale, the Court has further held that partnerships and labor
unions are not entitled to a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
privilege,2 6 but that sole proprietorships, however large, may still use
the privilege to suppress business and personal documents.2 7 In the
1944 decision White v. United States, the Court offered the following
test to determine whether a group is a "collective entity" and thus
entitled to no Fifth Amendment privilege:
The test . . . is whether one can fairly say under all the
circumstances that [the] particular type of organization has a
character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and
activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the
purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but
rather to embody their common of group interests only. If so,
the privilege cannot be invoked on behalf of the organization
or its representatives in their official capacity.2 8
Over thirty years later, however, in Bellis v. United States, the
Court noted that the White test was "not particularly helpful in the
broad range of cases,"2 9 but did not offer any replacement test. Since
Bellis, the Court had adopted a categorical approach to identifying
collective entities: if the business is ratified by the State, it is a
collective entity entitled to no self-incrimination rights; but if the
25 Id. at 74-76.
26 Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 93-97 (1974) (partnerships); White v.
United States, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944) (labor unions).
27 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984).
28 White, 322 U.S. at 701.
29 Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100.
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business is not ratified by the State, it retains its Fifth Amendment
right.30
B. The act-of-production privilege: an exception to the rule.
The collective entity doctrine is relatively well established:
artificial legal entities and their agents have no privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.31 In Fisher v. United
States,3 2 however, the Court announced an exception to this general
rule. The Fisher Court held that the Fifth Amendment prevents the
government from compelling a records custodian to produce, compile,
and authenticate business records if the custodian's "act of production"
would be personally self-incriminating.33 As the Court later explained,
by forcing a custodian to respond to a vague subpoena duces tecum,
the government compels the custodian to admit the sought-after
documents (i) exist, (ii) are in the custodian's possession or control,
(iii) are authentic, and (iv) match the subpoena's description.34 And
the "existence, custody, and authenticity" of certain documents i often
all a prosecutor needs to "furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed
to prosecute."35
Accordingly, the Court now draws a sharp distinction between the
contents of subpoenaed ocuments and the actions required to produce
such documents: a suspect cannot resist a subpoena on the grounds that
the contents of the sought-after documents are self-incriminatory; but
she can resist an overly broad subpoena if her mere compliance with
the subpoena would be self-incriminatory.36
The Fisher Court, however, left open the question of whether a
suspect could assert the act-of-production privilege simply because she
was the corporation's sole shareholder and records custodian. The
Court addressed-but did not fully resolve-this issue in Braswell v.
UnitedStates.37 In Braswell, a federal grandjury issued a subpoena to
Randy Braswell, ordering him to produce the books and records of his
3o Compare Doe, 465 U.S. at 617 (holding that sole proprietorships, no matter how
large, are not collective entities), with Bellis, 417 at 100-01 (holding that
corporations, no matter how small, are collective entities).
3' Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88-89.
32 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
3 3 Id. at 4102-123.
34 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36-37 (2000).
Id. at 37-38 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,486 (1951)).
36 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-13.
3' Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
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two single-shareholder corporations.38 Braswellresisted this subpoena
on Fifth Amendment grounds, arguing that, as the sole owner and
operator of these companies, his mere act of production would amount
to government-compelled self-incrimination, as a jury would
inevitably conclude that he created and produced the sought-after
documents.3 9 The district court rejected Braswell's Fifth Amendment
claim, holding that the collective entity doctrine "does not apply [even]
when a corporation is so small that it constitutes nothing more that the
individual's alter ego."4 0 The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
"Braswell, as [the] custodian of corporate documents, has no act of
production privilege under the fifth amendment regarding corporate
documents."41
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
affirmed the district court's ruling.4 2 "[T]he custodian of .. . entity
records holds those documents in a representative rather than personal
capacity," the majority reasoned.4 3  Thus, "the custodian's act of
production is not deemed a personal act, but rather an act of the
corporation."" And "[a]ny ... Fifth Amendment privilege asserted
by the agent would be tantamount to a claim of privilege by the
corporation-which of course has no such privilege."4 5 The Court's
ruling was categorical: "[A] custodian's production of corporate
records is deemed not to constitute testimonial self-incrimination," and
38 Id at 101.
39 See id.
40 Id. at 102 (quoting the District Court's opinion).
41 Id. (quoting the Fifth Circuit's opinion).
42
43 Id. at 109-10.
' Id. at 110. The Braswell decision, however, contains a puzzling footnote. Near
the end of the opinion, the Braswell majority noted:
We leave open the question whether the agency rationale
supports compelling a custodian to produce corporate
records when the custodian is able to establish, by
showing for example that he is the sole employee and
officer of the corporation, that the jury would inevitably
conclude that he produced the records.
Id. at 118 n. 11. It appears that the Braswell majority was leaving open the
possibility of act-of-production-like exception to its unconditional holding. Lower
courts, however, have completely ignored this footnote and have not entertained
any exceptions to the collective entity rule as announced in Braswell. See, e.g., In
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"[a] custodian may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth
Amendment grounds," regardless of how small or personal the entity
may be.4 6
In an unusual alliance, Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia in dissent in Braswell. Justice
Kennedy's sharp dissent argued that the majority's decision was
inconsistent with the "spirit and letter" of the Fifth Amendment.47 "By
issuing a subpoena...direct[ly] to [the business owner] personally,"
Justice Kennedy argued, "[the government] has forfeited any claim
that it is simply making a demand on [the] corporation."48 What the
government really seeks when it issues blanket subpoenas, the dissent
continued, is "the right to choose any corporate agent as the target of
its subpoena" and compel that individual to "disclose the contents of
his own mind." 4 9
The act-of-production privilege was again addressed in United
States v. Hubbell.s0 In Hubbell, the government issued a vague,
broadly worded subpoena duces tecum to Webster Hubbell, seeking
eleven categories of documents related to an Arkansas corporation.
Hubbell resisted this subpoena on Fifth Amendment grounds.52 The
prosecution obtained an order to compel production of the sought-after
documents, and Hubbell was forced to produce 13,120 pages of
documents that eventually were used to secure his indictment.5 3
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Self-Incrimination
Clause protects a witness from being compelled to disclose the
existence of incriminating documents that the Government is unable
to describe with "reasonable particularity."5 4 It was "apparent" that
the prosecution could not identify, procure, or authenticate the sought-
after documents without Hubbell's cooperation, the Court noted.
Thus, it used a vague and overly broad subpoena to compel his
cooperation, which essentially amounted to "a series of interrogatories
asking a witness to disclose the existence and location of particular
documents fitting certain broad descriptions."5 6 "[I]t [was]
4 6 Id. at 113.
47 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 126 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 127-28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 126, 128 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
5o United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
51 Id. at 31.
52 Id
53 Id.
54 Id. at 33-34.
5 5 Id. at 41.
56 d
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undeniable," the Court continued, "that providing a catalog of existing
documents fitting within any of the...broadly worded subpoena
categories could provide a prosecutor with a 'lead to incriminating
evidence,' or 'a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.'57
The Court concluded that this sort of"fishing expedition" is barred by
the Fifth Amendment when complying with the subpoena would lead
to testimonial self-incrimination.5 8
At the end of the day, once these cases are synthesized, you're left
with the following rule: state-sanctioned entities (such as corporations,
labor unions, and partnerships) and their records custodians have no
privilege against self-incrimination when responding to the
government's requests for business-related documents, unless the
records custodian's mere act of producing the requested records would
personally incriminate her.
III. BRASWELL IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S SELF-
INCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS EVOLVING UNDERSTANDING
AND RECOGNITION OF BUSINESSES'RIGHTS
Braswell stands in stark contrast with the Court's self-
incrimination jurisprudence and its decisions recognizing the
fundamental rights of business entities. This section illustrates how
the collective entity doctrine is inconsistent with the values underlying
the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Court's approach to other
constitutional rights.
A. Braswell is inconsistent with the values underlying the Self-
Incrimination Clause.
The authors of the Fifth Amendment "were not naive or
disregardful of the interests ofjustice."5 9 Rather, they enshrined in our
Bill of Rights the principle that it is better for an accused to go free
than for the prosecution to build its criminal case "with the assistance
of enforced disclosures by the accused."6 As the Court has instructed,
the Self-Incrimination Clause should be given a "liberal
7 Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 42-43.
5Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956).
6o Id. at 426-27.
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construction"6 1 to ensure the government does not compel an accused
to use "the contents of his own mind" to secure his own conviction.6 2
The purposes underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause were laid
out in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission ofN.Y Harbor.63 As the
Court explained, the Clause "reflects many of our fundamental values
and most noble aspirations," namely (1) to avoid the "cruel trilemma"
of perjury, contempt, or self-accusation that existed before the Self-
Incrimination Clause; (2) to ensure the prosecution "shoulders its
entire burden" during its criminal case, rather than forcing the accused
to work toward his own indictment or conviction; (3) to respect each
person's inner-sanctum of privacy and autonomy; (4) to require the
government to "leave the individual alone until good cause is shown
for disturbing him"; and (5) to protect the innocent, who often become
ensnared in overzealous or unfounded prosecutions."
All of these values are undercut in every case in which the
collective entity doctrine is applied to small, family-owned businesses.
Business owners, not their businesses, are routinely placed in the
"cruel trilemma" the Fifth Amendment was designed to avoid-
owners who do not comply with. the government's subpoenas are
typically held incontempt and compelled to self-accuse.6 5
The collective entity doctrine, moreover, allows the government to
intrude into small-business owners' private lives without good cause.
The Constitution provides a finely wrought procedure the state must
follow if it wishes to inspect an accused's private papers. The Fourth
Amendment dictates that the government may search or seize an
accused's "papers" or "effects" only if it has probable cause and the
intrusion is approved by a "neutral and detached magistrate."6 6 Under
Braswell, however, the government has free license to force nearly all
business owners to compile, organize, and authenticate thousands of
pages of potentially incriminating documents without cause and
without judicial oversight. Rather than "shoulder the entire load of its
prosecution,"6 7 Braswell allows the state to force the accused to do
most of the heavy lifting.
Moreover, allowing small-business owners to assert a Fifth
Amendment privilege would not hamstring white-collar law
61 Id. at 427.
62 Curio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957).
63 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
6 See id. at 55.
6 See generally In re Twelve Grand Jury Subpoenas, 908 F.3d 525 (9th Cir. 2018).
6 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
67 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 52, 54-55.
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enforcement.68 Even if the government's subpoena powers were
curtailed, the government would still be able to access its sought-after
documents by obtaining a search warrant through the normal and
minimally burdensome procedures already in place. Requiring the
government to go through these Fourth Amendment-required
procedures is a small price to pay when weighed against the Fifth
Amendment rights of millions of small-business owners.6 9
B. The Braswell majority's reasoning does not conform with the
Supreme Court's approach to other constitutional rights.
Under current Supreme Court precedent, collective entities have
the right to engage in free speech,70 the right to freely exercise their
religion,71 the right to freely associate with whom they choose,72 the
right to be free from unreasonable government searches and seizures,73
the right not to be tried for the same crime more than once,74 the right
to a jury trial,75 the right to equal protection under the law,7 6 and the
right to due process of law.7 7 The Braswell Court, however, held that
collective entities can never enjoy self-incrimination protections under
the Fifth Amendment.78 As Duke law professor Brandon Garrett has
explained: "This reasoning simply does not fit the Supreme Court's
approach to other constitutional rights, particularly in the way that
[collective entities'] lack of constitutional protection . . . has the
potential to deprive individuals of constitutional protection."79
The Braswell majority's categorical refusal to extend Fifth
Amendment rights to collective entities "directly impact[s] the rights
6 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 129 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69 Additionally, many business owners would be unable to assert a Fifth
Amendment privilege under the Court's "foregone conclusion" analysis described
in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411-12 (1976), and United States v.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43-44 (2000) (holding that a suspect cannot assert the act-of-
production privilege if the subpoena is so specific that the existence of the sought-
after documents is a "foregone conclusion").
7o Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364-65 (2010).
7' Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 708 (2014).
72 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
73 G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977).
74 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977).
" S. Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 350-52 (2012).
7 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 536 (1933).
n State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287,297 (1980).
7 Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108-10 (1988).
79 Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L.
REv. 95, 133 (2014).
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of individual employees [and officers]," depriving them of a
fundamental right simply because of their choice to compete in the
marketplace.so As the Hobby Lobby Court explained, a collective
entity's rights are often inseparable from the rights of those who "own,
run, and are employed by [that entity]," and "[w]hen rights . . . are
extended to [business entities], the purpose is to protect . . . these
people."
"The law is not captive to its own fictions." 82  When a prior
decision's doctrinal "underpinnings have been eroded by subsequent
developments [in] constitutional law," the principles of stare decisis
no longer apply.83 By revisiting and revising the collective entity
doctrine, the Court can restore its self-incrimination jurisprudence to
its rightful place and ensure that small-business owners are not
deprived of their fundamental constitutional rights simply because
they chose to compete in the marketplace.
IV. WITH THE EMERGENCE OF LLCs AND OTHER LIMITED LIABILITY
ENTITIES, BRASWELL IS CAUSING MILLIONS OF AMERICANS TO
UNKNOWINGLY WAIVE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
One of the main problems with the collective entity doctrine is that
nobody knows about it. When a soon-to-be small-business owner
begins filling out his LLC's articles of organization, there is no
warning that says, "by creating a state-recognized business entity, you
are hereby waiving your Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in certain situations." Instead, business owners are left
in the dark until the IRS comes knocking with a subpoena duces tecum,
only then to find out they have no privilege to withhold self-
incriminating business documents. Even more troubling, the
government can require their target to produce, compile, and organize
these sought-after documents, effectively requiring the business owner
to create the exhibits that will be used against her at trial. Due to the
explosion of modem limited liability entities (namely LLCs), the Court
should revisit the collective entity doctrine to ensure that current and
8 See id. at 157; see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J.
978, 1024 (2011) (arguing that the Court's categorical approach to the rights of
collective entities is misguided).
8i Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 707-08 (2014) (emphasis
added).
82 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 130 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
8 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 119 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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would-be business owners are not presented with an unconstitutional
Hobson's choice when they create a business.
A. Braswell presents would-be business owners with a surreptitious
and unconstitutional Hobson's choice.
"The emergence of the LLC is astounding."84 In 1988, when
Braswell was decided, only two states had laws recognizing LLCs.8 5
By 1997, however, every state had a statute allowing for the formation
of LLCs,8 6 and today there are over 1.2 million LLCs in the United
States-over 300,000 of which are single-member entities operated as
sole proprietorships.87
Under Braswell's reasoning, none of these businesses or their
custodians have Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights, and their
owners forfeited those same rights when they filed their articles of
organization with the state. Business owners do not forfeit their free
speech rights when they form a legal entity.8 8 Nor do they forfeit their
associational rights.89 They retain protections from unreasonable
searches and seizures.90 And they may continue to freely exercise their
religion without undue state interference.91 But, under Braswell,
business owners automatically forfeit their privilege against self-
incrimination when they form a state-recognized business entity.
Accordingly, Braswell presents would-be business owners with a
choice: they can create a state-recognized business entity or they can
retain their privilege against self-incrimination, but they cannot do
both. This Hobson's choice is particularly troublesome because
business owners are often completely unaware they are forfeiting a
fundamental right when the form a business entity. And, outside of
Braswell, there is nothing in the Court's Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence to suggest that forming a business should lead to the
I Sandra K. Miller, The Duty ofCare in the LLC: Maintaining Accountability
While Minimizing Judicial Interference, 87 NEB. L. REV. 125, 132 (2008).
8 Lance Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine in the New Era of
Limited Liability Entities-Should Business Entities Have a Fifth Amendment
Privilege?, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 79 (2005).
86 Lila L. Inman, Personal Enoughfor Protection: The Fifth Amendment and
Single-Member LLCs, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV..1067,1085, 1086 (2017).
8 See Brent M. Johnston, The Federal Tax Personality ofDisregardedLLCs, 47
WASHBURN L.J. 203, 203 n. 2 (2007).
8 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 364-65 (2010).
8 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
90 G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977).
91 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 707-08 (2014).
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forfeiture of constitutional rights, making the forfeiture all the more
surprising and troublesome.9 2
In this regard, Braswell is incompatible with the Court's
jurisprudence requiring knowing, intentional waivers of constitutional
rights. Implied waivers of constitutional rights are strongly
disfavored, and the Court has developed a strong presumption against
implied waivers of fundamental constitutional rights.9 3 The Court, for
example, will not recognize a waiver of Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination rights unless the waiver was (1) "the product of a free
and deliberate choice," and (2) "made with a full awareness of both the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it." 94 Contrary to this well-established law,
Braswell inserted a tacit, automatic waiver of self-incrimination rights
into every business's articles of organization. The moment a business-
owner files her charter with the state, she has unwittingly relinquished
one of her fundamental constitutional rights.
In a recent collective entity doctrine case, for example, the Ninth
Circuit held that because a small-business owner "cho[se] to operate
his businesses as a corporation or LLC and not as a sole
proprietorship," he "knowingly sought out the benefits of these forms"
and thus could not be "shielded from its costs."95 In other words, under
the current iteration of the collective entity doctrine, one of the "costs"
of being a small-business owner is a forfeiture of fundamental rights.
This sort of Hobson's choice is inconsistent with the Court's modem
understanding of constitutional rights.9 6  Withholding Fifth
Amendment rights from members of collective entities is inconsistent
with precedent and out-of-tune with our modem understanding of
business personhood.9 7
Braswell is also inconsistent with the act-of-production privilege
announced in Fisher and Hubbell. When a suspect is forced to comply
with a broadly worded subpoena, the government compels the
custodian to admit the sought-after documents (i) exist, (ii) are in the
suspect's custody or control, (iii) are authentic, and (iv) match the
92See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 130 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
9See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
94 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
5In re Twelve Grand Jury Subpoenas, 908 F.3d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 2018).
96 Cf Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1156 (10th Cir. 2013)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
97 See Allen J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the
Theory ofthe Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV.
L. REv. F. 273, 285-89 (2014).
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subpoena's description.9 8 And the "existence, custody, and
authenticity" of certain documents is often all a prosecutor needs to
"furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute."9 9 As it
is currently applied, the collective entity doctrine allows the
government to compel owners of small, family-owned businesses to
involuntarily further their own prosecutions. Accordingly, because of
Braswell and the courts' exception-free application of the collective
entity doctrine, small-business owners can be forced to create the
exhibits that will be used against them at trial. The Fifth Amendment
demands more.
B. The Court should, at a minimum, revisit this area of the law to
hold that single-member LLCs are not "collective entities"for the
purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause.
LLCs have "blur[red] the traditional distinctions between
individual and group business activities."' 00 Andclosely-heldLLCs-
unlike the large-scale corporations that dominated the business
landscape when Braswell was decided--do not possess independent
institutional identities; they are merely extensions of their owner(s).1
In the much-discussed Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission,102 for example, no court at any level of the case
even entertained the idea that the acts of Jack Phillips might be distinct
from the acts of his company. It was a basic assumption that, as the
company's sole owner and operator, Phillips's rights were inseparable
from his company's rights. The reason for this assumption is clear:
closely-held businesses are often mere extensions of their owners; and
withholding constitutional rights from a closely-held business is no
different than withholding constitutional rights from the people who
own and operate them.
As the Braswell Court itself recognized, its seemingly exception-
free collective entity rule is problematic when applied to single-
member businesses. In what has been termed "the Braswell footnote,"
the Court noted:
*United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36-37 (2000).
9 Id. at 37-38 (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
100 Cole, supra note 85, at 77.
101 See Imnan, supra note 86, at 1095, 1097.
102 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Coum'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018).
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We leave open the question whether the agency rationale
supports compelling a custodian to produce corporate records
when the custodian is able to establish, by showing for example
that he is the sole employee and officer of the corporation, that
the jury would inevitably conclude that he produced the
records.103
It appears the Braswell majority was leaving open the possibility
of an act-of-production-like exception to its unconditional holding.
The lower courts, however, have completely ignored this footnote and
have not entertained any exceptions to the collective entity rule
announced in the body of the Braswell opinion.104 For this reason,
Braswell remains unwavering, and with the rise of modem limited
liability entities, millions of Americans have unknowingly waived a
fundamental constitutional right. This explosion of limited liability
entities-which the Braswell Court could not have foreseen-warrants
a reevaluation of the collective entity doctrine.
Moreover, closely-held LLCs, unlike large corporations, are not
meaningfully distinguishable from sole proprietorships, which are
entitled to self-incrimination protections.os The Court in Bellis v.
United States, for example, explicitly noted that the collective entity
doctrine should often not apply to "small family partnership[s]."1 0 6
The Court cited with approval United States v. Slutsky,10 7 which held
that a small, two-man partnership could rely on the Fifth Amendment
as a safe haven because the partners were intimately involved in the
partnership's day-to-day operations.'o As a lower court later put it:
"the Bellis Court contemplated that individual owners of the proverbial
'Mom and Pop' stores would continue to enjoy the protection[s] of the
Fifth Amendment ... ."109
The rationale behind the Bellis "small family partnership"
exception applies with equal-if not greater-force to small, family-
owned LLCs, as they are often extremely personal businesses that are
mere extensions of their owners. Braswell, however, in effect
overruled this portion of Bellis and categorically withheld Fifth
10 Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 118 n. 11 (1988).
1" See, e.g., In re Twelve Grand Jury Subpoenas, 908 F.3d 525, 529-30 (9th Cir.
2018) (collecting cases).
10 See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984).
10' Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974).
107 United States v. Slutsky, 352 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).
0 8 Id. at 1107.
19 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 605 F. Supp. 174, 178 (E.D. N.Y.
1985).
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Amendment protections from these "Mom and Pop" businesses.1 1 o
Braswell, thus, is inconsistent with the case law that preceded it,' I and
the case law that has followed it. 1 12 This constitutional "anomaly" is
in need of reevaluation.1 1 3 As Penn State law professor Lance Cole
put it: "The exploding use of new forms of limited liability business
entities, and the application of the collective entity doctrine to those
new entities, necessitates a re-examination of the collective entity
doctrine."" 4
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS CONSIDERED
Throughout the last half-century or so, only two arguments in favor
of the collective entity doctrine have emerged: (1) it has "a lengthy and
distinguished pedigree," and (2) abolishing the doctrine would
hamstring white-collar law enforcement officials. This section rebuts
these arguments.
A. The collective entity doctrine may have a "lengthy " history, but it
is anything but "distinguished."
Supporters of the collective entity doctrine often quote Chief
Justice Rehnquist's language in Braswell, where he baldly asserts that
"collective entity rule has a lengthy and distinguished pedigree.""H5
This claim is half right: the collective entity doctrine has an extensive
history, but it is anything but "distinguished."
The collective entity doctrine has been roundly criticized by
judges, lawyers, and scholars since its inception. As professor William
Stuntz has noted, the collective entity doctrine originated from a
"single result-oriented paragraph" in Hale v. Henkel.'1 6 The Hale
Court, moreover, cited no authority in support of its reasoning and
showed a "remarkable" lack of analysis in issuing such a broad
pronouncement."' 7 In expanding upon Hale, the Supreme Court has
not been a model of consistency. The Court has often given
"wavering" and "varying" explanations for why an individual forfeits
"o See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108-10 (1988).
i" See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 101.
112See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 707-08 (2014).
"1Cole, supra note 85, at 12.
114 id.
"' Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104 (punctuation altered).
116 William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE
L.J. 393, 429 (1995) (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906)).
117 Cole, supra note 85, at 17-18.
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her Fifth Amendment rights merely because she works for a business
organization.'1 8 And the doctrine is currently out-of-line with the
Cburt's current understanding of corporate personhood.119 Labeling
the collective entity's pedigree as "distinguished" belies reality.
B. Discarding the collective entity doctrine would not hamstring
white-collar law enforcement.
As Justice Kennedy observed in his Braswell dissent, the purported
damage from limiting the collective entity doctrine is unlikely to
materialize for a number of reasons.12 0 First, many business owners
would not be able to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege under the
forgone conclusion analysis described in Fischer and Hubbell.12 1
Second, the businesses the government has a strong interest in
regulating would not fall into the single-owner exception contemplated
by the Braswell Court.12 2 Finally, and most importantly, even if the
government's subpoena powers were curtailed, it would still be able to
access its sought-after documents by obtaining a search warrant
through the normal, and minimally burdensome, procedures already
available.
Accordingly, the minimal and occasional frustration of the
government's subpoena power is a small price to pay for recognizing
and protecting business owners' constitutional rights--especially in
the case of small businesses, where the "testimonial consequences" of
complying with a subpoena are amplified.2 3  Requiring the
government to go through these Fourth Amendment-required
1" Alito, supra note 13, at 65-68.
119 See Inman, supra note 86, at 1067, 1071-72, 1097.
120 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 129 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(noting that "the dangers prophesied by the majority," and the government, were
"overstated").
121 See id at 120. Under the "foregone conclusion" doctrine, the recipient of a
subpoena cannot object to that subpoena if the government already has substantial
proof that the documents targeted by the subpoena exist. See generally Richard P.
Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73
VA. L. REv. 1, 29-40 (1987). More specifically, to overcome a suspect's Fifth
Amendment claim, the government must show (1) it is "in no way relying on the
'truthtelling' of the [suspect]," (2) the "existence and location of the [sought-after
documents] are a foregone conclusion and the [suspect] adds little or nothing to the
sum total of the [g]overnment's information" by producing the documents, and (3)
the document's "existence" or "possession" are not substantially at issue in the
case. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411-12 (1976).
122 See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118 n. 11.
123 See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613 (1984); Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118
n. 11.
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procedures is a small price to pay when weighed against the Fifth
Amendment rights of millions of small-business owners.
Moreover, the quantum leaps in technology since Braswell was
decided mean there is now an enormous difference in the ability of
prosecuting agencies to investigate cases. All prosecutors now have
easy online access to information from third-party sources (such as
Corporation Commissions, Secretary of States' Offices, and County
Recorders' Offices) and can easily access bank records and tax returns
for free. Investigative reports from companies such as Transunion are
also available to prosecuting agencies at minimal cost. Thus, the
"prosecutorial convenience" rationale underlying the Court's
collective entity cases no longer serves as a legitimate justification for
the wholesale forfeiture of business owners' Fifth Amendment rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1988, in Braswell v. United States, the Court held that small-
business owners have no right to resist government-issued subpoenas
on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination grounds. In the 30-plus years
since Braswell was decided, a lot has changed. Small, family-owned
LLCs have exploded in popularity, and the Supreme Court has greatly
expanded business entities' legal rights, recognizing that the
distinction between "business" and "owner" is often illusory. These
changes warrant at least a revisiting of and likely revisions to-the
collective entity doctrine. The Court should revisit the collective entity
doctrine to ensure that these small-business owners are not needlessly
and unwittingly forfeiting their fundamental self-incrimination rights.
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